The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows, Competitiveness Effects by Gernot Klepper & Sonja Peterson
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 









The EU Emissions Trading Scheme
Allowance Prices, Trade Flows, 
Competitiveness Effects 
Gernot Klepper and Sonja Peterson 
 
 












CCMP – Climate Change Modelling and Policy 
 
 













The EU Emissions Trading Scheme  




The upcoming European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is one of the more 
controversial climate policy instruments. Predictions about its likely impact and its 
performance can at present only be made to a certain degree. As long as the National 
Allocations Plans are not finally settled the overall supply of allowances is not 
determined. In this paper we will identify key features and key impacts of the EU ETS by 
scanning the range of likely allocation plans using the simulation model DART. The 
analysis of the simulation results highlights a number of interesting details in terms of 
allowance trade flows between member countries, of allowance prices, and in terms of 
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1. Introduction 
 
When the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for CO2 will start in 
2005 it will be known as one of the more controversial climate policy 
instruments. It is designed to achieve an economically efficient reduction of 
CO2 from major energy-intensive installations. Currently it covers around 
40 000 installations in the European Union which are responsible for roughly 
45 percent of all CO2-emmisions in the EU. As of today, there is considerable 
uncertainty about the impact of this trading scheme when it is in full operation 
and when the commitments of the member states of the EU to the Kyoto-
Protocol will need to be met in 2012. Consequently, speculations sprout about 
winners and losers among the member states, about costs to different sectors 
within members states as well as about the question as to which member state 
will be a net-seller and which one a net-buyer of emission allowances. Also, 
the range of prices for emission allowances is still wide open. In fact, many 
statements about the likely outcome of the ETS are more based on the desire 
to further ones commercial interest than on a balanced analysis of the 
evidence available so far. Existing quantitative simulation studies (Böhringer 
2002, Capros et al. 2000 & 2002) only analyse preliminary scenarios of the 
ETS that, for example, do not include the accession countries or account for 
different likely allocation modes.  
Predictions about the likely impact and the performance of the European ETS 
depend on the details of the allocation of emission rights within each member 
state. As long as the National Allocation Plans of the member states are not 
finally settled the overall supply of CO2-emission allowances is not determined. 
This obviously influences the price level for allowances. In addition, allocation 
rules that differ between member states will also influence trade flows. These 
issues of allocating the caps will be discussed below in greater detail. The 
second uncertainty concerns the fact that the impact of the EU ETS will 
exercise its full force in 2012. It is therefore necessary to assess the ETS in 
the light of the EU economy in the future; to be precise we choose 2012. This   3 
will be done with the help of the DART-model (Klepper, Peterson, Springer 
2003), a computable general equilibrium model calibrated for the enlarged EU. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify key features and key impacts of the EU 
ETS by scanning the range of likely allocation plans and by using a simulation 
analysis with the DART-model. This approach at the moment ignores some 
institutional details of the ETS such as the possibility for using the flexible 
mechanisms set out in the Kyoto-Protocol, i.e. Joint Implementation (JI) or the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which can potentially offer further 
inexpensive abatement options. It also ignores intertemporal issues such as 
banking and borrowing as well as the links to other national trading schemes in 
Denmark or the UK or to international trading activities. Despite these 
omissions the analysis highlights a number of interesting details about the EU 
ETS in terms of allowance trade flows between member countries, of 
allowance prices, and in terms of the role of the accession countries in the 
ETS. 
In the following we first summarize the background of the EU ETS and the 
international climate policy commitments of the EU. We then describe the 
DART-model and the way in which the ETS is implemented in this simulation 
model. Finally, we discuss the results of the simulation exercises and draw 
some conclusions. 
2. The European Kyoto Targets and the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme  
In the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 the EU agreed to cut down their overall GHG 
emissions relative to the 1990 level by 8 percent in the period from 2008 to 
2012. In 1998, the EU differentiated this target between their different member 
states in the so-called EU Burden-Sharing Agreement. The idea was that 
cohesion member states such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are 
given lighter burdens, compared to richer member states. They are thus 
allowed to increase their relatively small emissions while other EU member 
states stabilise or reduce emissions. The Eastern European accession   4 
countries that will join the EU in May 2004 and presumably in 2007 are not 
included in the Burden-Sharing Agreement but have their own individual Kyoto 
targets. The targets of all EU member states and accession countries are 
shown in figure 1.  
Figure 1 — EU Kyoto Targets According to the Burden-Sharing Agreement 
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To reach the European commitments at minimal costs a European Emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) for CO2 was designed that is at the heart of this paper.
1 
The ETS will start in 2005 and all member states of the European Union will be 
required to impose binding, absolute caps on CO2 emissions of facilities in 
energy activities, the production, and processing of ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals, the mineral industry and the pulp, paper and board production. The 
first trading period until 2007 is seen as a test for the second period from 
2008-2012 that coincidences with the first Kyoto commitment period.  
Even though an important step, the EU ETS alone cannot guarantee a cost 
effective reduction as it only covers the energy intensive industrial sectors and 
                                                            
1   For a summary of the EU directive (European Commission 2003) that establishes the ETS 
see e.g. Gagelmann and Hansjürgens (2002).   5 
only one of the greenhouse gases, CO2. The overall costs of the Kyoto target 
also depend on the emission reductions that are achieved in sectors and 
gases not covered by the ETS. If, for example, fearing negative 
competitiveness effects, the member states generously endow the sectors 
inside the ETS with emission permits, this implies that more emission 
reductions are necessary outside the trading scheme. To guarantee the cost 
effectiveness of the EU Kyoto strategy, the allocation of permits to the ETS 
has thus to account for the abatement costs and abatement potentials in non 
ETS sectors and for non CO2 greenhouse gases.  
The allocation of permits to the ETS is subject of the so-called National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) that, according to the EU directive, each member state 
has to prepare  before the beginning of each of the two trading periods from 
2005-2007 and 2008-2012. For the first period the NAP has to be submitted by 
the end of March 2004. In the NAP each country has to determine the total 
quantity of allowances in the ETS and to decide how it intends to allocate them 
to individual operators. The directive also mentions explicitly that the total 
quantity of allowances has to be consistent with the Kyoto emission targets of 
each country and with the assessments of actual and projected progress 
towards fulfilling the member States contributions to the Community's 
commitments. This is stressed again in the communication from the 
Commission on guidance to assist the Member states in establishing their 
NAPs (European Commission 2003a) Within three month the Commission can 
reject a plan and ask for changes to be made. In a final step, each Member 
State has to take its final decision on the NAP.  
To help the Member States establish the NAPs the EU Commission has 
published a ''Non-Paper'' (European Commission 2003) in which a step by 
step process to develop a NAP is outlined. The paper suggests that the first 
step should be to establish the share of the total allowable emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol that will be allocated to the installations covered by the 
trading scheme in a top-down economy-wide analysis. In a next step it is then 
suggested to collect data from the single installations and companies in a   6 
bottom up approach. The allocation of permits to each individual sector is 
finally determined based on current, historical or average emissions for a 
certain year.  We will talk in more detail about possible allocation modes in 
section 3.2.  
We will ignore in the following the problem of non-CO2 gases and focus on the 
question of reductions inside the ETS versus reductions outside and discuss 
the implications of the different allocation approaches. In addition, we will look 
at the role of the accession countries. Bulgaria, the Check Rebublic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Rumania , , Malta and Zyprus as well as the 
three Baltic States will become official members of the EU.
2 As EU members, 
these countries will also enter the EU ETS. This will influence the costs of 
achieving the European Kyoto target in two ways. First, Eastern Europe offers 
abatement opportunities that are much cheaper than in the current EU. 
Second, due to the economic recession in the 90ies, Eastern Europe's 
emissions are now below their Kyoto target. Selling some of their excess 
emission allowances (called hot-air) in the European ETS will further drive 
down the permit price and the economic costs in Western Europe. 
3.  Simulating the Effects of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  
An assessment of the likely allocation and welfare effects of the ETS requires 
at least two modelling steps. The first consists of the setting up of an 
appropriate economic model with which the European economy can be 
simulated for the time in which the trading scheme will be in full force. The 
second step involves the design of policy scenarios which are likely to arise 
between today and the time at which the Kyoto-Commitments are to be met. 
As a simulation tool we use the DART-model (Klepper, Peterson, Springer 
2003) which will be shortly characterized. We then derive the emission caps 
for the different member states that need to be met by 2012. 
                                                            
2   Except for the candidate countries Bulgaria and Rumania these countries will join the EU 
in Mai 2004. For Bulgaraia and Rumania accession to the EU is scheduled for 2007, the 
beginning of the second trading period of the ETS.    7 
3.1   The DART-Model 
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-
sector recursive dynamic CGE-model of the world economy. For the simulation 
of the European ETS it is calibrated to an aggregation of 16 regions. Table 1 
illustrates the 9 countries or group of countries of the EU including the 
accession countries of Eastern Europe and the other 7 world regions. 
Table 1 — Regions in DART 
BEN Belgium,  Luxembourg, Netherlands 
DEU Germany 
FRA France 
GBR United  Kingdom 
ITA Italy 
SCA  Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
SEU  Greece, Portugal, Spain 
REU Austria,  Ireland 
ACC*  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Other regions   
USA  United States of America 
FSU*  Former Soviet Union 
OAB  Other Annex B-countries (not in EU) 
MEA  Middle East, North Africa 
CPA China,  Hong-Kong 
IND India 
ROW  Rest of the World 
*The region ACC includes Bulgaria and Romania for which the accession in 2007 
is planned but not decided. It excludes the Baltic Countries which are aggregated 
in region FSU. This is due to the regional disaggregation of the current GTAP data 
set. This inconsistency has only a small effect since it distorts CO2-emissions of 
ACC by less than 5 percent. 
   8 
In each region or country the economy is disaggregated into 12 sectors. Four 
of these sectors participate in the ETS. Although there is no perfect match 
between the installations subject to the ETS and the sectoral structure of 
DART, we believe it to be sufficiently close. In addition, it also covers about 
45 percent of the CO2-emissions. 
Table 2 — Sector Structure in DART 
ETS-sectors   
OIL Refined  Oil  Products 
EGW Electricity 
IMS  Iron, Metal, and Steel 
PPP  Pulp and Paper Products 
Other sectors   
COL Coal  Extraction 
GAS  Natural Gas Production and Distribution 
CRU Crude  Oil  Production 
CEP Chemicals  Products 
AGR Agricultural  Products 
TRN Transport  Industries 
MOB Transportation  Services 
OTH  Other Manufactures and Services 
The economy in each region is modelled as a competitive economy with 
flexible prices and market clearing. There exist three types of agents: a 
representative consumer, a representative producer in each sector, and 
regional governments. All regions are connected through bilateral trade flows. 
The DART-model has a recursive-dynamic structure solving for a sequence of 
static one-period equilibria. The major exogenous drivers are the rate of 
productivity growth, the savings rate, the rate of change of the population, and 
the change in human capital.  
The model is calibrated to the GTAP5 data base that represents production 
and trade data for 1997. The elasticities of substitution for the energy goods   9 
coal, gas, and crude oil are calibrated in such a way as to reproduce the 
mission projections of the EIA (EIA 2002).
3 
3.2    Integration of Policy Scenarios in DART 
The simulation of the ETS requires first a determination of the emission caps 
for the EU member states. Table 3 shows the Kyoto targets for each region or 
country based on the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol 
(also see Figure 1).
4 The cap on country groups is the emission weighted 
average. The first column represents the percentage reduction required 
relative to 1990. The second column is derived from the business-as-usual 
(BAU) run of DART up to 2012 and represents the reduction required in 2012 
relative to the BAU in 2012. 
Table 3 – EU Kyoto Targets Relative to 1990 and 2012 Emissions  
  % Reduction target relative to 
Country/Region 1990  (Burden Sharing)  2012  (BAU in  DART) 
SCA -5.1    -7.7 
DEU -21.0    -11.3 
GBR -12.5  -12.9 
BEN -7.4  -24.0 
FRA 0.0  -11.3 
ITA -6.5  -15.9 
SEU +18.4  -11.9 
REU -4.1  -31.4 
EU15 -8.0  -14.2 
ACC  -7.0  Hot-Air of ca. 165 Mt CO2 
The BAU is calibrated to the climate policy measures enacted up to the 2001. 
Hence, it includes the impact of policies such as the German eco-tax or the 
national emissions trading schemes. From 2002 on, BAU keeps these policies 
in place but does not include any new climate policies. 
                                                            
3   For more details about DART see e.g. Springer (2002) or Klepper et al. (2003).   10 
So far, only the economy-wide emission targets have been computed. The 
ETS, however, requires targets which are set for the sectors involved in the 
trading scheme. The European Directive leaves it up to the member states to 
determine within their National Allocation Plans (NAP) which proportion of the 
emission reduction is to be supplied by those sectors participating within the 
ETS, and which proportion is supplied from the rest of the economy. The 
Commission of the EU suggests three modes of allocating targets in its non-
paper (European Commission 2003): 
•  The “historical emissions approach” (HIS) 
•  The “forecasting approach” (FUT) 
•  The “least cost approach” (LC). 
In the historical approach the total number of allowances allocated to the ETS 
installations is determined by multiplying the share of emissions of ETS 
installations in a particular base year (e.g. 2000) with the total allowable 
emissions in the economy. This approach together with the choice of a recent 
base year penalizes sectors or industries which have engaged in early action 
prior to the base year. In the forecasting approach allowances are allocated 
according to the business-as-usual shares expected at some future point in 
time, for example the end of the first commitment period to the Kyoto-Protocol 
in 2012. This system would in some way reflect the expected needs of faster 
and slower growing sectors in the economy. 
Finally, the least cost approach tries to take into account the fact that CO2-
abatement activities carry substantially different costs in different sectors. 
From an efficiency point of view this would not matter if all emission sources 
were to participate in the trading scheme. But since abatement costs will 
equalize only within the ETS, there is a danger that the historical and the 
forecasting approach may lead to strong differences in marginal abatement 
costs between the sectors within ETS and those outside the ETS. The least 
cost approach tries to take account of this inefficiency by dividing the cap 
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between ETS and Non-ETS sectors in such a way that the different abatement 
cost levels are recognized. Hence, the least-cost approach allocates relatively 
few allowances to sectors with low abatement costs. 
The three allocation modes have been implemented in DART in the following 
way: For the historical allocation mode the share of the ETS-sectors in 2000 
has been derived from the BAU run which includes climate policy measures 
taken up to 2000. In the forecasting mode, the BAU run was extended up to 
the year 2012 and the shares of that year are used to compute the division of 
allowances between the ETS installations and those outside. For the least cost 
approach we compute for each country or region an efficient abatement 
scenario which meets the caps of the Kyoto-Protocol in 2012. This can equally 
well be done with a uniform national CO2-tax or a comparable nation-wide 
emissions trading scheme. The resulting emission shares in 2012 are used to 
determine the allocation of allowances to the different sectors in the ETS. This 
approach leads to a unilaterally efficient allocation of allowances, hence there 
would be no permit trade within a country. However, as soon as trading starts 
between member states only those sectors participating in the ETS can gain 
from trading. 
Figure 2 summarizes the allocation of allowances to the ETS sectors in the 
different countries/regions according to the three allocation rules. It also shows 
the business-as-usual emissions (BAU) without the Kyoto-targets in place. It 
turns out that under the least-cost allocation rule (LC) the lowest targets are 
allocated.
5 This results from the fact that the installations within the ETS have 
lower abatement costs than those outside. Therefore, under a unilaterally 
efficient policy the ETS must accept a larger emission reduction than the 
sectors outside. 
Under the historical approach (HIS) the targets are slightly higher indicating 
that the ETS sectors have a somewhat larger share in emissions than that of 
the least-cost-approach. The two exceptions, Germany (DEU) and Denmark, 
Sweden, and Finland (SCA) are of special interest. They experience slightly   12 
lower targets in scenario HIS. Yet, this is only the case because the year 2001 
was chosen whereas for earlier reference years the ETS sectors had a 
significantly higher share in emissions. This indicates that the ETS sectors in 
Germany and the Nordic countries have been engaged in early action to a 
larger degree than the other member states and the non-trading sectors within 
their countries. Finally, the ETS sectors would receive the largest amount of 
allowances under the forecasting approach, mainly due to the fact that in the 
business-as-usual scenario the emissions of these sectors grow faster than 
those outside. 

















A final distinction in the different scenarios needs to be made for the accession 
countries, i.e. the region ACC in the DART model. The region ACC has a 
Kyoto target of –7 percent reduction relative to 1990 for the year 2012. The 
business-as-usual run of DART computes 730 Mt CO2 in 2012 which is 
18.5 percent below the Kyoto-target. Hence, the accession countries possess 
hot-air in the order of about 165 Mt CO2. In the policy simulations below we 
ignore the hot-air in most cases and assume that the emission targets are set 
at the business-as-usual level. If the hot-air is included we assume that all hot-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5   With the exception of SCA and DEU where HIS is slightly lower than LC targets.   13 
air is allocated to the trading sectors. We also concentrate in the following on 
the “least-cost” allocation rule for reasons that will be apparent in the 
discussion of the results in section 4.1. 
4. Simulation  Results 
In this section we present the results from simulating the scenarios described 
in the previous section. We present the results of the DART-model for the year 
2012 when the ETS is in full force and the Kyoto-targets under the EU burden-
sharing agreement need to be met. We first report and discuss the results for 
the allowance prices. Then we show the trade in allowances across the EU. 
Finally, we take a look at the changes in sectoral output and the expected 
competitiveness and welfare effects.  
4.1    Allowance Prices  
One of the major outcomes of the EU ETS that will determine its allocation 
effects is a uniform allowance price, i.e. a price on CO2, throughout the EU. 
Current estimates vary between 5 and 30€2000/tCO2. In the simulations with 
DART
6 the price in the central scenario turns out to be 11.1 €2000/tCO2. Over all 
scenarios it varies between 6.8 and 21.0 €2000/tCO2. Figure 3 shows the 
allowance prices in the different scenarios. The first block indicates the prices 
under the three different allocation rules LC, HIS, and FUT as described in 
section 3. The second block compares permit prices if only the old EU-15 
countries are trading, if all EU members trade but no hot-air is traded, and if 
the hot-air of the accession countries is also traded. 
Stricter targets for the installations in the ETS naturally lead to higher 
allowance prices. As a result of the lax emission target for the ETS sectors 
under the forecasting approach (FUT) the price turns out roughly one third 
lower than under the least-cost approach (LC). The choice of a certain 
referrnce year for determining targets can have a considerable effect as the 
year 2000 in scenario HIS and 2012 in scenario FUT show. Figure 3 also   14 
illustrates the importance of the accession countries for the trading scheme. 
Trading among the old EU members only (EU15) would result in a permit price 
of 21 €2000, whereas the low cost abatement options in the accession countries 
(LC) would bring prices down to 11 €2000. If these countries also sell their hot-
air (HA) they would bring down the allowance prices to slightly below 7 €2000. 
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The future scenario (FUT) is based on expected business as usual emissions 
in 2012. Since the abatement cost functions in the sectors outside the ETS are 
much steeper than those of the sectors inside the allowance price of 7 €2000 
goes hand in hand with an average emission tax outside the ETS of almost 
40 €2000 (see Figure 4 that shows the emission weighted average tax that 
needs to be imposed in the different scenarios compared to the allowance 
price). Similarly, when the year 2000 emissions are chosen for the allocation of 
allowances permit prices of 9 €2000 coexist with average emission taxes of 
almost 32 €2000. In both cases the allocation of emissions to the ETS is not 
based on abatement costs but only on actual or expected emissions. To the 
contrary, the comparison of average taxes and permit prices in the least-cost 
scenario (LC) indicates the efficiency gains from trading since the reference 
situation for the allocation of allowances was an efficient abatement structure. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6   We use an exchange rate of 1 €2000 = 1.0971 US$ 1997 as the DART-model uses 1997 
data.   15 
Hence, the divergence between the allowance price [11 €2000] and the tax 
outside the ETS [23 €2000] is a measure for the gains from trading across 
countries. In fact, these numbers tend to underestimate the gains from trading 
since it is unlikely that the climate policies pursued outside the ETS will be 
conducted through an efficient emission tax. Under other less efficient regimes 
the implicit taxes necessary for achieving the same emission target would be 
significantly higher thus increasing the divergence in abatement costs. 
The simulations clearly indicate the importance of the allocation rule of targets 
for the level of prices in the ETS but also for the burden of abatement costs 
that is subsequently imposed upon the sectors not participating in the ETS. In 
fact, under all three allocation rules there are strong incentives for sectors to 
participate in the ETS. The simulations also reveal that the least-cost 
allocation rule results in the smallest distortions between the sectors inside the 
ETS and those outside. 
Figure 4  —  Emission  Weighted  Average Tax Rates Outside the ETS 
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4.2   Trade in Emission Permits 
Abatement costs for CO2 vary not only within a country but to an even larger 
degree across countries. As can be seen in Figure 5, there are essentially four 
groups of countries with rather different marginal abatement costs for reaching 
their EU burden-sharing targets without emissions trading. The highest cost 
are in the Benelux countries plus Ireland and Austria with around 50 
€2000/tCO2. Italy and the UK have abatement costs of about 25 €2000/tCO2 
whereas the other current EU countries (France, Germany, Southern Europe 
except Italy, and Scandinavia) cost amount to 14 to 16 €2000/tCO2. Finally, the 
accession countries, by definition, have zero cost of abatement as they have 
no binding target in 2012. 
Figure 5 — CO2-Taxes Under Unilateral Action 
25,0 














ITA  FRA  DEU  GBR  SCA  BEN  SEU  REU  Allow. 
Euro/tCO2 
 
This is due to a number of factors such as the size of the emission cap relative 
to the BAU emissions, the availability of inexpensive abatement options, or to 
the availability of hot-air.  
The ETS of the EU turns out to lead to a rather lopsided affair. The accession 
countries will export allowances to all other member states. Figure 6 illustrates 
the amount of allowances traded within the ETS. The only exporters are the 
accession countries (ACC). The overall amount of allowances available in the 
ETS under the “least-cost-principle” and without the inclusion of hot-air is   17 
1140 Mt CO2. Out of this 130 Mt CO2 will be net exports from ACC, i.e. net 
trade amounts to roughly 11 percent of emissions in the ETS.  

















The accession countries with allocated allowances amounting to their 
business-as-usual emissions have available 480 Mt CO2 of which they export 
27 percent. These exports go predominantly to the large countries UK, 
Germany, and France but also to the Benelux Countries. However, relative to 
their domestic endowments Austria and Ireland combined will be the largest 
importers by having 33 percent of their consumed allowances imported. The 
Benelux Countries come in second with an import quota of 27 percent. In 
comparison France and Germany import around 6 percent of the emission 
allowances consumed and the southern regions (SEU) and the Scandinavian 
member states (SCA) import only around 3.5 percent. 
Figure 6 also shows that the trade in allowances will be dominated by the 
electricity sector (EGW). With the exception of France because of its large 
share of nuclear energy in electricity consumption, more than 75 percent of 
exports and imports will come from and go to the electricity sector. The rest is 
dominated by imports from the iron, metal and steel sector (IMS) with pulp and 
paper products (PPP) and refined oil products (OIL) almost negligible.   18 
There have been speculations about the likely trade structure that would 
emerge without the accession countries. Figure 7 illustrates this case. Since 
the low cost option from the accession countries is not available the above 
mentioned group of countries with the low abatement costs among the EU-15 
(France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 
would be exporters with most of the exports coming from Germany and the 
southern countries (except Italy). The largest importers would be the Benelux 
countries. This restricted EU-15 trading scheme would lower the marginal 
abatement cost from and average of 23 €2000/tCO2 in the no-trading case to 
21 €2000/tCO2. These 2 €2000/tCO2 can be viewed as a measure of the 
efficiency gain from trading. In contrast, the permit price in the full trading 
scheme (including ACC) is only 11 €2000/tCO2. This illustrates the tremendous 
efficiency gains from including the ACC country group
7.  
Figure 7 —  EU-15 Trading Without the Accession Countries  
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4.3  Competitiveness Effects 
A major concern of policy makers and industry is that the ETS will have 
negative competitiveness effects for the participating sectors. There are three 
important points in this context. First of all, it should be clear that any 
competitiveness effects are not a result of the ETS but of the emission 
restrictions implied by the Kyoto target. The ETS is indeed lowering the 
negative affects of reaching this target compared to pure unilateral action (see 
section 4.2 and 4.4). Second, the simulation results show that altogether the 
competitiveness effects of the ETS and the Kyoto targets are relatively small. 
Finally, it is not true, that the competitiveness of sectors covered by the ETS is 
affected more than the competitiveness of the sectors outside. 
The cross-country flows of CO2-allowances from the accession countries 
towards the West indicate that the ETS will in the first place allow the energy-
intensive installations within the trading scheme to reduce emissions and 
consequently production to a lesser degree than under a unilateral climate 
policy scenario (UNI) in which the EU burden-sharing targets need to be met 
independently. Simulations with the DART-model show that this is the case but 
it also carries over to sectors not in the ETS. Figure 8 shows the output effect 
of the EU burden-sharing for the importing countries, i.e. the EU-15. We have 
selected the energy sectors in the ETS [Oil products (OIL), Electricity (EGW)], 
energy outside the ETS [coal extraction (COL), gas production and distribution 
(GAS)], energy-intensive sectors in the ETS [iron, metal and steel (IMS), pulp 
and paper products (PPP)], and energy-intensive sectors outside the ETS 
[chemicals (CEP), transport sector (MOB)]. The non-energy intensive sectors 
outside the ETS (AGR, TRN, OTH) are not included as output changes are 
negligible. In Figure 8 the output losses in LC are represented by the light grey 
bar, whereas the losses under UNI are the sum of the light and the dark grey 
bar. The dark grey bar thus shows the losses that can be avoided by 
implementing the emissions trading scheme.     20 
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The most remarkable result from comparing the ETS with a unilateral climate 
policy is the fact that all energy-intensive sectors gain from the ETS. Of 
course, the energy sectors and the energy-intensive industries inside the ETS 
can reduce their output losses by more than 50 percent. But these cost 
savings also carry over to the other energy-intensive industries to some extent. 
Figure 8 also shows that the ETS decreases total output in the EU are only by 
around 0.3 percent. The effects on all non-energy sectors are below 2 percent 
in each country. In the energy intensive sectors outside the ETS (chemical and 
mobility sector) there are two exceptions which are the Benelux countries and 
the Rest of Europe. Here the output losses reach 11 and 5 percent. This is due 
to the comparatively high emission intensity of these sectors in the EU. For 
example, in the chemical sector in the Benelux countries, energy intensive 
fertilizer production plays an important role.  
The losses are naturally higher in the energy sectors coal and gas whether 
they are covered by the ETS or not. The restrictions on CO2-emissions 
naturally reduce demand for fossil energy sources and thus reduce output in 
those extraction industries. In addition, coal is the most emission intensive 
fossil fuel which is substituted by low carbon energy under emission 
restrictions.    21 
Finally, Figure 8 shows that the sectors inside the ETS clearly gain from an 
emissions trading scheme and are thus affected less from climate policy than 
the sectors outside the ETS. There are three reasons for this 
(1) Competitiveness  effects  depend on the exposure of a sector to the world 
market. Some of the sectors most exposed to the world market such as the 
chemical sector are outside the ETS. The detailed sectoral data show 
indeed that in the unilateral scenario the chemical sector suffers more than 
the IMS and PPP sector inside the ETS.  
(2)  The sectors outside the ETS are indirectly affected by the emission 
restrictions inside the ETS as well. In another paper Peterson (2003) shows 
that these indirect effects that originate from changes in gross energy 
prices and demand or from prices of intermediate inputs in some cases 
even dominate the direct effects from the ETS or the other climate policies.  
(3) Reaching the Kyoto targets requires severe reductions outside the ETS as 
well. As shown already in section 4.1, taxes that are associated with these 
reductions are much higher than the allowance price. As a result, the 
sectors outside the ETS are affected more strongly than the sectors inside.  
Finally it should be noted, that the strength of the effects differs between 
individual countries. Some of the main factors that influence this strength are 
discussed in the next section. In addition, the differences in the energy 
intensity as e.g. described for the chemical sector in the Benelux countries do 
play a role. For more details see also Peterson (2003).  
4.5  The Welfare Costs of Different EU Climate Strategies 
The main goal of the EU emissions trading scheme is to reduce the welfare 
costs of meeting the European emission targets. Figure 9 shows the 
aggregated EU welfare changes relative to the BAU scenario in the different 
trading scenarios compared to a scenario where the individual commitments 
are reached unilaterally by a uniform, country specific CO2 tax (UNI) .   22 
First of all, optimally designed, the ETS leads indeed to cost savings. While 
the EU on average loses 1.1 percent welfare under unilateral action, this 
reduces to 0.9 percent in scenario LC. One important result of our simulations 
though is, that the goal of cost reductions is achieved only if the allocation of 
allowances to the ETS is geared to the least cost allocation. Comparing the 
welfare impact of reaching the Kyoto-target unilaterally with the two other 
trading scenarios based on actual and expected emission shares reveals no 
welfare gain. Apparently, the welfare gains from trading within the ETS are 
offset by the distortions created through the divergence of abatement costs 
between sectors inside and outside the ETS. These distortions are not present 
in the unilateral scenario which is created under the – admittedly unrealistic – 
assumption of a uniform national CO2-tax. Nevertheless, the results clearly 
indicate that distortionary allocation plans can quickly eliminate the gains from 
trading in the ETS. 
Figure 9 also shows that without the cheap abatement options in the 
accession countries, the ETS would offer practically no efficiency gains. Again, 
the welfare gains from the trading regime are balanced by the distortions 
emerging from the difference in abatement costs between ETS installations 
and emitters outside the ETS. If we include the hot-air of the accession 
countries in the ETS the welfare losses can be reduced to 0.7 percent. 
However, this gain is due to the fact that the overall amount of emissions is 
substantially higher than in the trading scheme without hot-air.  
Turning to the economic costs for the individual EU member countries, these 
can differ considerably. Figure 10 shows the welfare changes across countries 
for the UNI and the LC scenario. Again,  the welfare cost under LC is the light 
grey bar and under UNI it is the sum of the light and dark grey bars.   23 
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Except for France and the Southern European Countries (SEU) without Italy all 
countries gain from importing allowances compared to a scenario without 
trading. The degree to which they gain depends on two factors: 
•  The strictness of the national Kyoto-target relative to the business-as-
usual emissions, and 
•  the differences in abatement costs across different member states. 
Both of these factors are illustrated by the implicit CO2-taxes necessary to 
achieve the Kyoto-targets unilaterally (see Figure 5 in section 4.2). The largest 
gains from ETS accrue to the Benelux countries (BEN) and Austria and Ireland 
(REU) because they experience the largest difference between allowance 
price and unilateral tax rate. 
France experiences no gains from trading in the ETS although it has the same 
implicit unilateral CO2-tax than Germany which can lower its welfare costs from 
1.2 percent to 1.0 percent. This is due to the fact that France is not trading 
many allowances because of its low emission intensity in the electricity sector. 
Hence, it can not reap large gains from trading as much of the emission 
reduction will need to take place outside the ETS.   24 
Figure 10 —  Welfare  Loss Under  the  Least-Cost Allocation (LC) and Under 












A special case is the case of the accession countries. It is surprising to see 
that these countries loose welfare compared to the BAU scenario (0.4 percent) 
even though they do not need to reduce emissions and sell emission 
allowances. The income received through the export of allowances marks the 
gain from allowance trading. Yet, there are some costs as well. By joining the 
ETS these countries now face an allowance price in all ETS sectors thus 
reducing their competitiveness. This shows up in the simulations as lower 
production and lower exports mainly in the energy intensive Iron, metal and 
steel sector (IMS) which traditionally has a comparative advantage on 
international markets. It also carries over to non-ETS sectors through higher 
input and energy prices comeing from ETS-sectors. 
By comparing the welfare loss to ACC in the ETS to the unilateral scenario 
(UNI) we can identify the impact of the ETS. Under UNI the region ACC 
experiences a welfare gain of 0.1 percent. This gain comes from the indirect 
effects of low cost abatement options. ACC exports energy-intensive products 
to the rest of the EU because their production cost including the emission 
constraint rise more than those in ACC. The introduction of the trading scheme 
raises allowance prices in the ACC such that the comparative advantage of   25 
the energy-intensive sectors is reduced. This trade effect can not be 
compensated by the income received from exporting allowances as the 
volume is too small. However, if the ACC would use some of their hot-air, they 
could reduce allowance prices thus reducing the burden to their ETS sectors 
and at the same time increase the income from exporting allowances. In fact, 
with a supply of 25 percent of the hot-air available the welfare loss could be 
reduced to zero. Larger amounts of hot-air would even lead to a welfare gain 
for ACC of 0.8 percent relative to BAU: 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The upcoming EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) for CO2 evokes 
ambiguous reactions. Proponents advertise its contribution to the minimizing of 
the cost of meeting the European Kyoto targets. Opponents such as some 
policy makers and industry fear that it will have negative competitiveness 
effects for the participating sectors. So far both positions have been based 
more on interested speculations than on sound modelling results. Indeed, the 
eventual results of the ETS are difficult to predict as long as the National 
Allocation Plans of the EU member states are not determined. In this paper we 
have used the DART-model to simulate the ETS under different likely 
allocation plans. The results reveal new details about the likely allowance 
prices, about allowance trade flows as well as about cost savings and 
competitiveness effects that differ considerably across different allocation 
modes.  
The first striking result is, that the accession countries will be the only 
countries selling allowances, even without hot-air being included in the 
simulations. Their low cost abatement opportunities reduce the costs of 
reaching the European Kyoto targets considerably. This is for instance 
reflected in the difference between the allowance price (in the year 2012 when 
the ETS is in full operation) of 11 €2000/t CO2 if the accession countries are 
included in the ETS and 21 €2000/t CO2  if the accession countries would not 
participate.   26 
The second main finding concerns the division of the costs of reaching the 
Kyoto targets between the sectors inside the ETS and those not participating. 
Given the Kyoto targets, the share of emissions allocated to the ETS 
automatically determines the emission reductions that are necessary in the 
sectors that do not participate in emissions trading. The optimal, cost 
minimizing allocation would be one that equalizes the marginal abatement 
costs of the Kyoto target across all EU economies, e.g. through a trading 
scheme including all CO2 emissions. Since the ETS covers only the energy-
intensive industries efficiency can not be reached. However, the efficiency 
gains from the ETS depend strongly on the allocation plan that allocates the 
caps to the ETS and the non-ETS sectors. If the allocation plan is not based 
on abatement costs, but on actual or expected emissions the efficiency gains 
from trading allowances are partially or even completely offset by the 
distortions created between the ETS and the non-ETS sectors. In particular, 
the simulations show that such an allocation mode would in general lead to a 
higher amount of allowances allocated to the ETS than a least-cost approach. 
This, in turn, implies lower allowance prices (7 €2000/t CO2  instead of 
11 €2000/t CO2) but also higher taxes in the non ETS sectors (on average 
39 €2000/t CO2  instead of 23 €2000/t CO2 ). As a result the ETS under historical 
or under expected emission shares does not lead to a welfare gain. Only 
theallocation rule with least-cost reductions clearly improves efficiency and 
creates welfare gains. These simulation results are based on the assumption 
of an efficient climate policy in the sectors outside the ETS. If, as it is to be 
expected, current inefficient instruments are tightened instead of being 
replaced by efficient ones, the distorting effects would be even larger thus 
further limiting the positive contribution of the ETS to overall welfare. However, 
this is not due to defects of the ETS itself but to the lack of a broader coverage 
of the ETS across all emitting sectors. 
Turning to the competitiveness effects it should be clear that it is not the 
trading scheme that imposes new restrictions but the Kyoto-target itself. The 
ETS is only a means to achieve this target at higher or smaller social cost. If   27 
the ETS were to be introduced throughout the EU and if it would cover all 
sectors it would lead to considerable welfare gains compared to a situation 
where the Kyoto-targets need to be reached unilaterally. Even thogh this is not 
the case, under the least cost allocation (Scenario LC) there are still gains to 
be made from trading. One of the most remarkable simulation results is, that 
indeed all sectors gain from trade – not only the sectors participating in 
emissions trading. In addition, the overall competitiveness effects of the Kyoto-
targets can become quite small the the ETS. In our simulations total output in 
Europe decreases by less than 0.5 percent compared to a business as usual 
scenario. Output in all non-energy sectors falls by less than 2 percent. Only 
the fossil fuel and energy sectors naturally face higher losses. Finally, it is not 
true that the competitiveness of the ETS sectors is affected more than the 
competitiveness of the sectors outside. To the contrary, ETS sectors gain 
considerably from the cheap abatement opportunities in the accession 
countries. This gain is represented by the differences between the allowance 
price of 11 €2000/t CO2 in the ETS and the average tax outside the ETS of 
23 €2000/t CO2.   28 
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